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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The City concurs in the Mayor's statement of the case. 
None. 
The City does not seek attorneys fees on appeal. 
1. ARTICLE VIII, 5 3's VOTING REQUIREMENT DOES NOT APPLY TO ORDINARY AND 
NECESSARY EXPENSES THAT ARISE IN THE ORDINARY ADMINISTRATION F LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS. 
This Court should affinn the District Court's holding because the City's obligations 
under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement are ordinary and necessary expenses within the 
meaning of Art. VIII, 5 3 of the Idaho Constitution, and therefore no authorizing vote is required. 
That section provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
No city shall incur any indebtedness, or liability, in any manner, or 
for any purpose, exceeding in that year, the income and revenue 
provided for it for such year, without the assent of two-thirds of the 
qualified electors thereof voting at an election to be held for that 
purpose, nor unless provisions shall be made for the collection of 
an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest on such indebtedness as 
it falls due, and also to constitute a sinking fund for the payment of 
the principal thereof . . . Any indebtedness or liability incurred 
contrary to this provision shall be void: Provided, that this section 
shall not be construed to apply to the ordinary and necessary 
expenses authorized by the general laws of the state.. . .(emphasis 
added). 
In this case, the Mayor does not dispute the District Court's finding that the City's 
obligations under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement are "ordinary" within the meaning of Art. 
VIII, 5 3.1 Thus, the only issue before this Court is whether those obligations are "necessary." 
The City asserts that its payment obligations under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement 
constitute "ordinary and necessary expenses" within the meaning of the Constitution because 
they arise in the ordinary course of local government affairs and submits that the present appeal 
can be resolved by referring to the constitutional debates and the extensive case law regarding 
the ordinary and necessary expense proviso within Art. VIII, 5 3. 
B DR~FTERS' INTENT AND ART VIII, $ 3 3  PROVISO CLAUSE 
The proceedings and debates of the ldaho Constitutional Convention of 1889 contain an 
extensive discussion of local government finance and the purpose of Art. VIII, 5 3. Those 
proceedings show that although "[mJany convention delegates wanted to severely limit the 
ability of local governments to incur indebtednes~,"~ the drafters also recognized that the 
ongoing administration of local government and the need of local governments to fulfill statutory 
duties and legal obligations required some flexibility in a local government's ability to incur debt 
without submitting each potential obligation or expenditure to a vote.3 
The initial draft of Art. VIII, 5 3 would have prohibited any municipal debt or obligation 
which extended beyond one year without approval of two-thirds of the voters at a special 
e l e~ t ion .~  The delegates quickly realized that the original draft of Art. VIII, 5 3 "went too far in 
limiting local government."5 Recognizing that the strict voting requirements in the original text 
1 Appellant's Brief, at 6. 
2 Dennis C. Colson, Idaho's Constitution: The Tie that Binds 198 (1991) 
3 For instance, Judge William Claggett expressed concern that Art. VIII, 5 3 as originally drafted - without 
the proviso - would severely impede the "ordinary administration of [local government] affairs." I.W. 
Hart, Proceedings andDebales of the Constitutional Convention of ldaho, 588 and 591 (1912); see also the 
City's Brief to the District Court, dated March 17, 2009, at 5 A.I., pp. 19-20 (R. Vol. I1 at 552-53). 
4 Colson, supra, at 198-99 
5 Id. at 199. 
of Art. V111, 5 3 would create an untenable situation for local governments, Judge William 
Claggett, one of the most respected members of the convention, observed that the proposed debt 
limitation would severely impede the "ordinary administration of [local govenment] affairs."6 
He noted that: 
[Ilf you pass that section in the way it is you will absolutely 
require that when a witness wants to get his fees, after he has 
attended upon the court, before he can do it the county 
commissioners have got to stop and submit at a special election to 
the whole vote of the people as to whether they will pay them or 
n0t.7 
To avoid this impractical and unrealistic state of affairs, he proposed the following 
language: "Provided, That this section shall not be construed to apply to any ordinary 
indebtedness created under the general laws of the state."s~he delegates' comments make clear 
that this exception9 was a compromise intended to give governmental authorities the freedom to 
incur indebtedness when necessary to the efficient administration of local government, while still 
preserving the integrity of the Idaho Constitution's "spirit of economy."10 The delegates 
recognized that the orderly and efficient administration of local government required that certain 
debts-"ordinary indebtedness" under Judge Claggett's proposal-be exempt from' the voting 
requirements of Art. VIII, 5 3. Judge CIaggett's comments provide a clear statement of the 
intent of the drafters in inserting the proviso clause: 
6 Elart, supra,. at 588. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 586. 
9 This exception is referred to as the "proviso" clause. See City ofBoise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 3, 137 P.3d 
388, 390 (2006). 
lo  Id at 5, 137 P.3d at 392 (quoting Williams v. City ofEmmett, 51 Idaho 500, 505,6 P.2d 475,476 (193 1). 
I simply call the attention of the convention to the fact that the way 
it [Art. VIII, $ 31 reads now it would prohibit the issuance of 
county scrip to pay the ordinary indebtedness absolutely imposed 
upon the county as provided by law, in case there should be any 
heavy expenses, as suggested by Mr. Hampton, exceeding the 
current revenues of that year; and that i f  is intended to apply to 
special indebtedness, I should judge.]] 
I offered this proviso to call the attention of the convention to this 
matter. We don't want to go over this too fast. For instance, the 
general laws of the state will provide that the witness fees are so 
much, the mileage fees are so much, all the expenses of the county 
government are fixed by law. Those expenses are paid annually by 
the issuance of county scrip, or paid as they arise by the issuance 
of county scrip. We all know that in the practical administration of 
county government, that there sometimes will be extraordinary 
expenses, I mean extraordinary expenses in the ordinary 
administration of affairs. I am not speaking now of special 
indebtedness at all, but the ordinary general indebtedness which is 
incurred in the way of administration of county affairs . . .[The 
purpose of the proviso] is to limit the section [Art. VIII, 5 31 to 
such indebtedness as does not arise under the ordinary 
administration ofthe county.12 
The delegates knew that in the "ordinary" course of affairs, local governments would 
sometimes encounter "extraordinary" expenses that cumulatively exceeded the budget for the 
current year.13 These "extraordinary expenses," which the Framers intended to be exempt from 
the voting requirements, were separate from "special indebtedness," which all of the delegates 
agreed required prior voter approval. Several of the delegates gave practical examples of the 
type of extraordinary expenses that should not require a public vote. Delegate Weldon Heyburn 
1 Hart, supra, at 587 (emphasis added). 
l2 Id at 588-589 (emphasis added) 
l3  As the City explained in its Brief to the District Court, Judge Claggett's statement about "extraordinary 
expenses in the ordinary administration of county affairs ...." referred to expenses occurring within the 
ordinary administration of county affairs which exceeded available revenues within a county's budget year. 
In contrast, his reference Lo "special indebtedness" meant expenditures which are unusual, infrequent, and 
not occurring in the customary administration of the county. See the City's Brief to the District Court at 5 
111 A.l, at p. 20-21, and p. 21, footnote 25 (R. Vol. 11 at553-54). 
noted that "[tlhe expenses of the crirninal court instead of being upon the litigants as in civil 
cases are upon the county," and in the event of "an unusual number of capital cases," the 
expenses could easily exceed the revenue allocated for criminal trials in a given year.14 
Explaining why such expenses should not require a vote, Delegate Heyburn said "[wle don't 
want to have any part of our court expenses in doubt . . . and we don't want to call a county 
election for the purpose of making up a deficit of four or five hundred dollars at the end of the 
year."l5 Delegate Peter Pefley, the mayor of Boise, gave another example of the type of 
"ordinary and necessary'. maintenance expenditures that municipalities would periodically 
encounter. 
We have streams running adjacent through the city that in time of 
high water, and ditches all the time, that are liable as I said to break 
away and run down through the city, and if we had to wait to hold 
an election and get two-thirds of the voters to ratify another levy, 
the whole city might be ruined before it could be abated,and I 
would not like to see anything of that kind occur.16 
Importantly, the drafters' debates concerning the proviso clause focused on the ordinary 
character of the municipal obligations, rather than any particular urgency driving the need for 
the expenditure. The examples cited above show that the drafters intended that municipalities be 
able to incur those obligations which were essential to the ordinary administration of 
governmental affairs without an authorizing election and that Art. VIII, 5 3's voting requirement 
was reserved for those expenditures which William Claggett referred to as "special 
l4  Hart, supra, at 590-91 
i da r591 .  
l6 id at 592. 
I 7  id at 588-589. 
c .  THE CHARACTER OF THE DEBT, NOT THE PRACTICALITY OF HOLDING AN ELECTION, 
DETERMINES WHETHER AN OBLIGATIONIS ORDINARY AND NECESSARX 
It is clear from the constitutional convention that the drafters recognized that a certain 
class of "ordinary" debt could properly be incurred regardless of the practicality of first 
submitting the matter to the voters. This, ,of course, was the whole thrust behind the proviso 
clause. The Framers understood that the voting requirement only applied to "such indebtedness 
as does not arise under the ordinary administration of the [local government]."l8 Thus, the 
analysis under the proviso clause depends on a finding that the character of the proposed 
indebtedness is the type of debt that arises under the ordinary administration of local government 
affairs,l9 or in other words, the obligation is essential to a local government's ability to fulfill its 
customary or recurring governmental or proprietary functions. 
The drafters did not intend that the proviso's applicability would depend on a finding that 
it is impractical to hold an election. Perceptive observers then and now have recognized that 
presenting every issue of multi-year municipal debt to the voters would be impractical and 
completely unworkable.20 Delegate Weldon Weyburn noted that, "Elections are held in our 
county at an expense of eight or nine hundred dollars - for the purpose of determining whether 
or not you shall issue $500 worth of warrants - that is the practical application of the principle, 
and it is hardly worthwhile to go to this expense."21 However, this discussion of practicality is 
merely a by-product of the underlying ordinary and necessary analysis. Merely because it is 
possible to delay an expenditure long enough to conduct a public vote does not necessarily mean 
I s  Id (comments of William Claggett). 
19 id 
20 In a recent decision, Justice Jim Jones of the Idaho Supreme Court observed, with regard to the voter 
approval requirement of Art. VIII 3, that "[llt is a virtual impossibility to present every multi-year 
governmental contract or lease to the public for a vote." li2 re Universily Place/Idaho Water Center Project, 
146 Idaho 527, 199 P.3d 102, 122 (2008) (J. Jones, J., specially concurring). 
21 Hart, supra, at 591 (comments of Weldon Heyburn) 
a city or county must do so. The Framers did not intend to tie local officials' hands to the point 
where unsound or absurd results would follow. Rather the proviso was grounded in the need for 
practicality in administering the ordinary affairs of local government. 
Early Idaho case law similarly reflects the intent of the drafters that municipalities could 
properly incur a certain class of routine debt necessary for the ordinary administration of 
governmentaf affairs without first submitting the matter to the voters. In Butler v. City of 
Lewiston,22 for instance, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the issuance of bonds to fund the 
payment of salaries of city officers and employees, "other necessary municipal expenses," and a 
tort judgment against the city, finding that these were "ordinary and necessary expenses" within 
the meaning of Art. VIII, 5 3.23 In H i c k e y  v. C i t y  of NampaF4 the Court held that bonds issued 
to fund debts incurred to repair and replace a city's water system which had been destroyed by 
fire, purchase firefighting equipment, pay the salaries of officers and pay other "necessary 
expenditures in ihe m a i n t e n a n c e  of the municipal government" were "ordinary and necessary 
expenses" within the meaning of Art. VIE, 5 3.25 In Corum v. Common School Dist. No. 2 I z 6  
the Court held that "[tlhe employment of teachers by trustees of common school districts was a 
duty imposed upon them by law, and the cost thereof was an 'ordinary and necessary 
expense' ...."27 Other Idaho cases also demonstrate that those debts which, by their character, 
22 1 l ldaho 393,83 P. 234 (1905). 
23 Id at 404, 83 P. at 238; see also the City's Brief to the District Court at 5 III.A.1, pp. 22-23 (R. Vo l .  I1 at 
555-56). 
24 22 Idaho 41, 124 P. 280 (1912). 
25 id. at 43, 124 P. at 280 (emphasis added); see also the City's Brief to  the District Court at III.A.l, pp. 23- 
24 (R. Vol .  11 at 556-57). 
26 55 ldaho 725,47 P.2d 889 (1935) 
27 Id at 730,47 P.2d at 891 (emphasis added); see also thc City's Brief to the District Court at $ IILC.?., p. 
38 (R. Vol. I1 at 571). 
a r e  essential  to the ongoing administration and maintenance of local government  and the  
fulfil lment of legal obligations are "ordinary and necessary expenses."28 
011 the other  hand, the Framers did intend Art. VIII, $ 3's vot ing requirement to apply to 
what they  called "special indebtedness," meaning,  as stated by Judge Claggett, those debts which 
do not arise in the ordinary course of administering local government-in other words, long-term 
indebtedness issued o r  incurred to finance large capital projects. Subsequent decisions of the 
Idaho Supreme Cour t  reflect this  intent, namely,  Bannock County v. C Bunting & Co. (issuance 
of warrants for t he  purchase of land for a courthouse must be submitted to a vote)?9 Dunbar I,. 
Board of Corn 'rs of Canyon County (construction of a bridge i s  not "ordinary and necessarym),30 
Asson v. City of Burley (contracts unconditionally obligating cities to pay debt issued to finance 
the construction of nuclear power plants are not "ordinary and necessaryn).31 
Determining w h a t  constitutes an "ordinary and necessary" expense is necessar i ly  a case- 
by-case, fact-specific analysis.32 The Framers  but d id  no? articulate any particular f ramework  or 
28 See Thomas v Glindeman, 33 Idaho 394, 195 P. 92 (1921) (snow and ice removal on public streets, and 
police and fire protection) ,Jones v. Power Co., 27 Idaho 656, 150 P. 35 (1915) (construction of a. jail in a 
newly created county), Bannock County v. Bunting, 4 Idaho 156, 37 P. 277 (1894) (acquisition of a 
temporary jail), City of Pocatello v. Peterson, 93 Idaho 774, 473 P.2d 644 (1970) (repair, replacement and 
expansion of existing municipal airport facilities determined to be unsound, inadequate and unsafe, Board 
ofCounty C0mi.s o f  Twin Falls County v. Idaho Health Facilities Authority, 96 Idaho 498, 531 F.2d 588 
(1974) (improvements to hospital facilities to comply with state safety standards), Ray v. Nampa School 
District #131, 120 Idaho 117, 814 P.2d 17 (1990) (employment contract with maintenance electrician for a 
school district), Hanson v. City ofldaho Falls, 92 Idaho 512, 514, 446 P.2d 634, 636 (1968) (salaries of 
public employees), and Loomis v. Cily of Hailey, I19 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991) (repair and 
replacement of system components of public works projects). See also the City's Brief to the District 
Court at 5 IILA.2, pp. 27-28 and 5 III.C.3 (R. Vol. I1 at 560-61). 
29 4 Idaho 156,37 P. 277 (1894) 
30 5 Idaho 407,49 P. 409 (1897) 
31 105 Idaho 432,670 P.2d 839 (1983). 
32 The Court recognized this principle by its statement in City of Boise v. Frazier that "[wlhether a proposed 
expenditure is ordinary and necessary depends on the surrounding circumstances of each case." 143 Idaho 
at 7, 137 P.3d at 394. 
litmus test with which to determine whether an expenditure was ordinary and necessary and thus 
exempt from Art. VIII, 5 3. Several of the delegates gave examples of the types of projects 
which would constitute "ordinary and necessary expenses,"33 but the Framers established no 
bright line rule by which to measure such indebtedness. Consequently, early Supre~ne Court 
case law quickly recognized that a determination of whether a given expense arises in the 
ordinary administration of local government affairs-and thus is ordinary and necessary- 
necessarily requires a case-by-case analysis that takes into account all of the facts and 
circumstances associated with the proposed indebtedness and the particular purpose for which 
the debt will be used. 
The following are examples of expenditures which, after a careful analysis of the facts 
associated with the indebtedness, have been held by the Idaho Supreme Court lo be "ordinary 
and necessary expenses": 
e Snow and ice removal on public streets, and police and fire protection34 
c Construction of a jail in a newly created county35 
4 Repair, replacement and expansion of existing municipal airport facilities 
determined to be unsound, inadequate and unsafe36 
e Improvements to hospital facilities to comply with state safety ~tandards3~ 
Hart, supra, at 584-94 (The delegates suggested that "heavy county expenses," "coult expenses," "any 
emergency," "extraordinary expenses," "witness fees," "mileage fees," "repairing ditches and water courses 
and any part of the ordinary legitimate expenses of running county government," would qualify as 
"ordinary and necessary"). 
34 Thomas v. Glindeman. 33 Idaho 394, 195 P. 92 (1921). 
35 Jones v. Power Co., 27 Idaho 656, 150 P. 35 (1915) 
36 City ofPocatello v. Peterson, 93 Idaho 774,473 P.2d 644 (1970). 
37 Board ofCounty Conz8rs of Twin Falls County v. Idaho Health Facilities Authorify, 96 Idaho 498,53 1 P.2d 
588 (1974). 
0 Contract to procure a school teacher and payment of the teacher's 
Employment contract with maintenance electrician for a school district39 
Salaries of public employees40 
Replacement of water system41 
0 Repair and replacement of system components of public works projects42 
The case-by-case analysis which the Court has used to determine that these expenditures 
were ordinary and necessary shows that, as the Framers intended, the character of the obligation 
is the key factor in determining whether an expense arises in the ordinary administration of 
government affairs and thus exempt from Art. VIII, § 3's voting requirements. 
In City of Boise v. Frazier, the Court held that financing the construction of a new multi- 
level airport parking structure was not an ordinary and necessary expense.43 The Court noted in 
Frazier that "urgency," compelled by the need to protect public safety can, in certain 
circumsta:ces, make the expenditure necessary within the meaning of Art. VIII, 5 3.44 On the 
facts before it, the Court appropriately found that construction of a new multi-level parking 
38 Corum v. Common Schooi Dist No. 21,55 Idaho 725,47 P.2d 889 (1935). 
39 Ray v. NampaSchool District #131, 120 Idaho 117,814 P.2d 17 (1990). 
40 Butler v. City of Lewiston, 11 Idaho 393, 83 P. 234 (1905); Hickey v. City ofNampa, 22 Idaho 41, 124 P. 
280 (1912); Hansoxv. City ofldaho Falls, 92 Idaho 512, 514,446 P.2d 634,636 (1968) ("One of the most 
fundamental and necessary expenses of municipal government is that which is incurred in the provision of 
adequate police protection for persons and property. Certainly it could not be argued in good faith that the 
weekly or monthly compensation of municipal employees is not an ordinary and necessary expense within 
the proviso of art. VIII, 5 3."). 
41 Hickey v. City ofNampa, 22 Idaho 41, 124 P. 280 (1912). 
42 Loomis v. City ofHailey, 119 Idaho 434,807 P.2d 1272 (1991). 
43 143 Idaho 1, 137 P.3d 388 (2006). 
44 Id. at 6-7. 137 P.3d at 393-394 
garage was not urgent, and thus not necessary.45 However, the City submits that urgency is not 
the litmus test for determining whether governmental obligations are ordinary and necessary. 
In Frazier, the Court confirmed that "[wlhether a proposed expenditure is ordinary and 
necessary depends on the surrounding circumstances of each case."46 This suggests that the 
presence of urgency is not a bright-line rule applicable to all potential government expenses. 
Rather the Court's statement shows that urgency is only one factor, among others, that could 
satisfy the "necessary" prong. Importantly, Frazier did not overrule any of the Court's prior 
decisions, nor did the Court suggest that the Frazier rule superseded any of the Court's prior Art. 
VIII, 5 3 precedent. Thus, previous Idaho Supreme Court decisions interpreting Art. VIII, 5 3 
continue to be instructive in discerning what constitutes an ordinary and necessary expense. 
Importantly, the Court in Frazier specifically acknowledged that earlier Art. VIII, 5 3 cases were 
correctly decided even where urgency was not a factor.47 
For example, the Frazier court acknowledged that "expenses incurred in the repair and 
improvement of existing facilities can qualify as ordinary and necessary expenses."48 Both of 
the cases on which the Frazier court relied for that proposition, City ofPocatello v. Peterson and 
Bd. of County Comm'rs of Twin Falls County v. Idaho Heath Facilities Authority, discuss the 
role public safety plays in the analysis. However, neither case discussed any sort of urgency or 
emergency requiring that the expense be made in the designated ~ e a r . ~ 9  This led to the Court's 
45 See City's Brief to the District Court at 5 III.C.3, pp. 39-40 (R. Vol. I1 at 572-73). 
46 143 Idaho at 7, 137 P.3d at 394. 
47 Id. at 6, 137 P.3d at 393 (affirming the holdings of City of Pocatello v. Peterson, 93 Idaho 774, 473 P.2d 
644 (1970) and Bd ofCounfy Comm 'rs of Twin Falls Counfy v. Idaho Health Facilities Authority, 96 Idaho 
498, 531. P.2d 588 (1974)). 
48 Id (citing Idaho Health ~acilities Authority, 96 Idaho 498, 531 P.2d 588 and Peterson, 93 Idaho 774, 473 
P.2d 644). 
49 See Peterson: 93 Idaho 774, 473 P.2d 644 and Idaho Health Facilities Authority, 96 Idaho 498, 531 P.2d 
588. 
acknowledgement in Fraziev that the urgency which it had associated with the necessary prong 
was a malleable concept and that various factors-some of which have iiotliing to do with 
"immediacy" or "emergency"-may satisfy the "necessary" prong of the proviso's test. "The 
required urgency can result from a number of possible causes, such as threats to public safety, 
the need for repairs, maintenance, or preservation of existing property, or a legal obligation to 
make the expenditure without delay."50 It is important to note that the list of factors which the 
Frazier court stated could stand in the place of urgency was illustrative, not exclusive. Thus, 
after a case-by-case analysis focusing on the character of the proposed debt, courts may find that 
other different factors can satisfy the necessary prong, urgency being but one of them.51 
Nowhere during the constitutional convention did the Framers indicate that cxpenses 
must be "urgent" in order to fall under the proviso. As noted above, the delegates gave examples 
of the types of expenses they believed would fall under the proviso. While some expenses, such 
as "any emergency" or repairing damaged ditches and  watercourse^^^ do suggest that an e!ement 
of urgency could be indicative of an ordinary and necessary expense, other examples the Framers 
provided are absolutely devoid of any urgency whatsoever. Clearly the payment of "witness 
fees," "mileage fees," and "the ordinary legitimate expenses of running county government" do 
not convey a sense of urgency. Judge Claggett's comments to the Constitutional Convention 
regarding "ordinary indebtedness" and "extraordinary expenses in the ordinary administration of 
affairsn-both of which are encompassed by the proviso clause-are particularly instructive.53 
- 
50 Frazier, 143 Idaho at 6-7, 137 P.3d at 393-94 (emphasis added). 
51 Id at 6, 137 P.3d at 393 ("expenses incurred in the repair and improvement of existing facilities can qualify 
as ordinary and necessary under the proviso clause") (emphasis added). 
52 See Hart, Supra, at 587 and 592. 
53  Id at 588. Judge Claggett's comments indicate that the proviso clause covers expenditures which qualify 
as "the ordinary general indebtedness which is incurred in the way of administration of county affairs." Id 
Moreover, analyzing the proviso terms separately, as this Court has required,54 leads to the 
conclusion that first one must evaluate the character of the obligation. As the City has argued 
above, an expense may be considered "necessary" where the character of the obligation is such 
that it arises in the ordinary administration of local government affairs-in other words if it is 
essential to the government's administration of its ordinary or customary functions. 
The obligation at issue in Frazier involved a large-scale, capital project (i.e., "special 
indebtedness"), an obligation that quite cleaily was not a customary, recurring'or core function 
arising in the ordinary administration of the City ofBoise9s affairs. After analyzing the character 
of the obligation in Frazier, this Court noted that such an obligation would only fall under the 
proviso clause if there were an urgency for making the expense.55 In reaching its holding, the 
Court specifically distinguished the Peterson and Idaho Health Facilities Authority cases by 
noting that the character of the obligations in those cases was "necessary," within the meaning of 
the proviso, because of the "impact on public safety."56 The obligation in Frazier did not arise 
in the ordinary course of governmental affairs, it was not a repair or improvement to an existing 
facility, it was not a response to a public health concern or public safety need, and it was not 
urgent. Thus, based on the circulnstances of that case, the Court was correct to hold that the 
obligation was not necessary under Art. VIII, $ 3 .  
54 See, e . g ,  Asson v. City of Burley, 105 Idaho 432, 441, 670 P.2d 839, 848 (1983) ("We note at the outset 
that this proviso consists of two requirements: (1) that the expense be ordinary and necessary, and (2) that it 
be authorized by the general laws ofthe state.") 
55 Frazier, 143 Idaho at 5,137 P.3d at 392 
Id at 6, 137 P.3d at 393. See also Peterson, 93 Idaho 774, 473 P.2d 644 and Idaho Health Facilities 
Authority, 96 Idaho 498, 531 P.2d 588. The Peterson court did not hold that the expansion of the airport 
was "urgent." Rather it held that repairing airport facilities, which "have become obsolete and have ceased 
to provide the necessary safety demanded by air travelers," was an ordinary and necessary expense, thus 
obviating the need for a bond election. 93 Idaho at 778-79,473 P.2d at 648-49. 
The City subinits that the specific holding of Frazier does not apply to circumstances 
similar to the obligations under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement, where the character of the 
debt is such that it arises in the ordinary administration of local government affairs. 57 Rather, 
the Frazier's holding is applicable only in circumstances where a case-by-case analysis of the 
character of the obligation shows that it is a large, capital project, is not a repair or improvement 
to an existing facility, does not impact public health or safety, is not urgent, or meets a need that 
can be satisfied by other 1neans.58 
11. THE CITY'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE RENEWAL POWER SALES AGREEMENT ARE 
ORDINARY AND NECESSARY EXPENSES BECAUSE THEY ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE CITY'S 
ABILITY TO PROVIDE RELIABLE, LOW-COST ELECTRICAL SERVICE - A  FUNCTION WHICH 
ARISES M THE ORDINARY ADMIN~STRATION F THE CITY'S AFFAIRS. 
A. A FINDING OF URGENCY IS NOT REQUIRED HERE BECAUSE THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER 
TJfE RENEWAL POWER SALES AGREEMENT ARISE IN THE ORDINARY ADMINISTRATION 
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTAFFAIRS. 
Purchases of cost-based power supplies under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement are 
essential to the City's ability to provide its residents with reliable and affordable electricity.59 
Simply because the power supplies to be acquired pursuant to the Renewal Power Sales 
Agreement need not and will not be delivered or paid for immediately does not make such power 
57 The City does not contend that merely because an expense is necessary or essential to fulfill a 
governmental fui~ction it will automatically fall under the proviso. In the Asson case, discussed below, the 
court found that a city's participation in the construction of a nuclear power generating plant did not fall 
within the proviso because they were not "ordinary" expenses where there was "a colossal undertaking, 
fraught with financial risk." Thus, the proviso contains two checks on a municipality's ability to incur debt 
without a vote: the expense must be "ordinary" andthe expense must also be "necessary." 
58 See Frazier, 143 Idaho at 6, 137 P.3d at 393 (noting that the obligation in Frazier could not qualify as a 
repair or improvement because "the expansion is so profound as to constitute an entirely new construction 
in every meaningful sense"). 
59 See Affidavit of Jo A. Elg in Support of Petition for Judicial Confirmation dated March 13,2009 (the "Elg 
Affmit") at p. 4, nn 8-9 (R. Vol. 11 at 518). See also Affidavit of Jacqueline Flowers in Support of 
Petition for Judicial Confirmation dated March 12,2009 (the "Flowers Afiduvit") at pp. 3 and 10, nT 8 and 
28 (R. Vol. I1 at 506 and 513), Elg Affidavit at pp. 7-10, 18-23 (R. Vol. I1 at 521-24) and the Report of 
Mooney Consulting, dated November 25,2009 (the "Mooney Report"), at p. 27 (R. VoI. I at 62). 
acquisitions any less "necessary" to the City or its inhabitants. While the City has developed 
local hydroelectric generating resources and has sought to develop additional thermal generating 
sources to complement its hydroelectric supplies, the City depends lnaterially on wholesale 
power supplies to meet the requirements of the customers served by the System. The provision 
of reliable, low cost supplies of electricity to residential, commercial and industrial customers is 
necessary to the City's ability to promote and protect the public welfare and the local econorny, 
and thus is an expense that arises in the ordinary administration of local government affairs. The 
Idaho Legislature recognized the vital role of reliable, cost effective and stable electrical energy 
in our society when it enacted Idaho Code § 50-342A(1), to provide specific authority for 
municipal utilities to enter into joint ownership arrangements for power projects. In enacting 
that section, the Legislature found and determined that: 
Securing long-term electric generation and transinission resources 
at cost-based rates is essential to the ability of municipal utilities to 
provide reliable and economic electric services at stable prices to 
the consumers and coinmunities they serve and is essential to the 
economy and the econornic development of their colnmunities and 
to the public health, safety and welfare. 60 
The purchase of wholesale power supplies is no different than providing water, sewer or 
sanitation services, or any other routine "pay-as-you-go" expense associated with the regular 
operation of municipal government and the fulfilling of duties that arise in the ordinary 
administration of the City's affairs.61 It is every bit as essential to fulfilling the "ordinary 
legitimate expenses of running [local] government" as the payment of the salaries of municipal 
6O Idaho Code 5 50-342A(1); see also Idaho Code $5  50-325 and 50-342fb) 
61 in Asson v. City of Burley, the Supreme Court differentiated between true "power purchase contracts" and 
other types of "long-term debt obligations" involving large, capital construction projects and suggested that 
a bona-fide power purchase agreement would, by its very nature, be an ordinary and necessary municipal 
expense. 105 Idaho 432,443,670 P.2d 839,850 (1983). 
enlployees, the purchase of water for distribution to consumers, the removal of snow and ice on 
public streets, and ensuring adequate police and fire protection.62 
It is often in the best interest of a city to enter into multi-year contracts for regular and 
recurring services that enable the city to perform basic govenunental services or fulfill statutory 
duties. A multi-year contract often provides cost savings and reduced administrative costs. A 
multi-year contract can provide stability and avoid payment of unnecessary administrative costs 
associated with frequent supplier changes. Quite frequently, a multi-year franchise contract is 
necessary to induce a franchisee to undertake significant capital expenditures in order to supply a 
much needed commodity or service such as sanitation services or fire protection services.63 
Cities in Idaho routinely enter into multi-year contracts for essential services such as 
health insurance for municipal employees, maintenance and repair of public safety dispatch 
equipment and computers, purchase of critical fuel supplies for public safety vehicles, provision 
of sanitation collection services, and fire protection or police and public safety services. Even 
janitorial service contracts sometimes require multi-year commitments in order to secure 
economical or favorable terms. Idaho Falls has a three-year contract in place with the unions for 
its electrical workers and firefighters, a two-year contract for health insurance for its employees 
and a thirty-year contract with Bonneville for the transmission of power from the Federal Power 
System to Idaho Falls Power. It also frequently enters into short term multi-year supplemental 
power contracts as necessary to shape its electrical load and meet seasonal power demands. G4 
62 Thomas, 33 Idaho 394, 195 P. 92; Loomis, 119 Idaho 434,807 P.2d 1272; Butler, 11 Idaho 393, 83 P. 234; 
Hickey, 22 Idaho 41, 124 P. 280; Hanson, 92 Idaho 512,446 P.2d 634. 
63 See e.g Plummer v. City ofFruitland> 140 Idaho 1, 7: 89 P.3d 841, 847 (2004) ("A solid waste supplier 
needs a long-term commitment from its municipal customers so it can obtain financing which is necessary 
to purchase the amount of equipment and type of equipment required to best service [its] citizens . . .") 
64 As discussed in the Elg Affidavit and the Engineer's Report, Idaho Falls Power projects that its allocation 
of power under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement will be approximately 3 aMW less than the System's 
net power supply requirements. Thus, during the term of the Renewal Power Sales Agreement, the City will 
stili need to execute agreements for supplemental power in order to meet the System's power requirements, 
None of these multi-year contracts are considered "urgent," yet they are necessary within the 
meaning of Art. VIII, $ 3. The payment obligations under these arrangements, as well as under 
the Renewal Power Sales Agreement, are essential to the City's ability to perform the functions 
which arise in the ordinary administration of the City's affairs, and any "indebtedness or 
liability" they may create is an ordinary and necessary expense of the City within the meaning of 
Art. VIII, $ 3. 
The specific contractual terms for the sale of power by Bonneville under the Renewal 
Power Sales Agreement make it clear that the Renewal Power Sales Agreement is a true service 
contract for the purchase of power on a "pay-as-you-go" basis. Under the Renewal Power Sales 
Agreement, Bonneville commits to sell and the City commits to purchase specified monthly 
blocks of power (the "Block" power supply product) as well as a percentage of the actual output 
of Bonneville's federal power system (the "Slice" power supply product).65 The City will 
purchase this power as it would pay for purchases under any other service contract-by inaking 
monthly payments, in arrears, and only for power made available by Bonneville during the 
preceding month.66 
beyond the power supplied by Bonneville under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement. Those supplemental 
power contracts will undoubtedly require multi-year commitments. Repetitive elections for the purpose of 
submitting to the voters the question of entering into supplemental power purchase agreements would be 
highly inefficient and costly, and would significantly hinder Idaho Falls Power's primary objectives of 
facilitating maximum rate stability and maintaining low rates. Thus, the present case is important not only 
to confirm the City's authority to enter into and perform the Renewal Power Sales Agreement, but also to 
clarify the City's ability to purchase supplemental power supplies under "true" power purchase agreements 
that extend beyond a single year. See discussion of the City's supplemental power needs in the City's Brief 
to the District Court, at $ III.E.2, pp. 45-47 (R. Vol. I1 at 578-80). 
65 Renewal Power Sales Agreement, $3.2. 
See Elg Affidavit at pp. 11, 13 and 14, 71 28, 32 and 35 (R. Vol. I1 at 525, 527 and 528); see also $ 5  3.2 
and 16.1 of the Renewal Power Sales Agreement (R. Vol I at 98 and 137). Bonneville's power supply 
operation "makes available" power to the City by delivering it to the points of receipt under the City's firm 
The Renewal Power Sales Agreement does not contain any provision unconditionally 
obligating the City to make payments to Bonneville regardless of whether Bonneville delivers 
any power (e g ,  a "Hell-or-High-Water" provision, as was the case in Asson, discussed below). 
While Section 3.2 of the Renewal Power Sales Agreement obligates the City to pay for power 
that Bonneville in fact makes available regardless of whether the City elects to take delivery of 
the power, this provision is tempered by the "Uncontrollable Force" provisions of the Renewal 
Power Sales Agreement which excuses failures to perform by the City due to events beyond its 
control, including specifically any failure ofthe facilities of the System that prevent Idaho Falls 
Power from delivering power to its customers. The City is not required to make payments if 
Bonneville does not make power available to the City.67 
Under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement, the City will not issue bonds or other debt LO 
fund its payment obligations, it will not be exposed to any construction risk and it will not 
guarantee the debts or obligations of any third party. Bonneville has used the federal power 
system--consisting of 3 1 federal hydroelectric projects and several non-federal hydroelectric and 
thermal projects in the Pacific Northwest, representing 225 separate generating units (refened to 
herein as the "Federal Power SystemJ')-to provide the City with reliable, low-cost power since 
1963 and to other preference customers dating back to the 1930s. Bonneville is now committing 
to use those same existing and operating power supply resources to serve the City with cost- 
transmission contract with Bonneville's transmission operation under which power is transmitted to the 
System. See Elg Affidavit at p.14,135 (R. Vol. I1 at 528). 
67 There are, of course, certain risks inherent in purchasing power from Bonneville. For example, under the 
"Slice" power supply product, Idaho Falls Power will pay a flat monthly fee for a specified percentage of 
the output of the Federal Power System. The City's per-unit cost of power will be lower in high water 
years when the Federal Power System produces more electricity, but will be higher in low water years 
when production is reduced. However, there is no realistic possibility that the City will receive no power 
under the "Slice" product - the Federal Power System includes dozens of generating projects and 225 
separate generating units. all of which have operated reliably for many years. See Elg Affidavit at pp. 9-10 
and 12-13, fl/ 22 and 28-30 (R Vol. I1 at 523-24 and 526-27). 
based power for another seventeen years under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement. Under the 
terms of the Renewal Power Sales Agreement, only the firm generation from the existing 
resources of the Federal Power System is used to serve the City, and Bonneville has no statutory 
authority to construct new facilities to provide this service.68 
The Renewal Power Sales Agreement is analogous to other service contracts previously 
upheld by the Idaho Supreme Court. For example, in Corum the Court determined that a 
contract to hire a teacher and pay the teacher's monthly salary was, even though it extended 
beyond the current annual budget, indeed an "ordinary and necessary expense" not subject to the 
voting requirements of Art. VIII, § 3.69 Similarly, in Ray, the Court held that multi-year 
enlployment contracts for school employees were "ordinary and necessaryq' within the meaning 
of Art. VIII, 3 3, despite the fact that such contracts extended beyond a single budget year.70 
The procurement of long-term power supply services to meet the needs of an existing and 
operating municipal electric utility is no different than the procurement of the services of school 
district employees on a multi-year basis. 
Purchases of electric power supplies are just as necessary as other types of ordinarily- 
occurring municipal expenses, such as the payment of city officials' and employees9 salaries, 
which were upheld by the Court in Butler and Hickey as expenses that "clearly come within the 
proviso."71 Such purchases are just as important as the continual payment of policemen 
retirement benefits upheld in Hanson. And such purchases are just as essential as the ongoing 
repair of municipal property upheld in Peterson and Hickey and the provision of municipal 
services like snow and ice removal upheld in Thomas. 
68 See Elg Affidavit at p. 9 , j  22 (R. Vol. II at 523); see aiso Mooney Report at p. 27 (R. Vol. 1 at 62). 
69 55 Idaho at 730,47 P.2d at 891. 
70 120 Idaho at 120,814 P.2d at20. 
7' Butler, l l  Idaho at 404, 83 P. at 238. 
These types of municipal expenditures, while they may obligate a city on a long-term 
basis, are entirely different from the "special indebtedness" at issue in Frazier and other "capital 
projects" cases, such as Dunbar, Bannock County and Asson. The obligations at issue in each of 
these cases entailed financing the construction of new, large-scale capital projects---expenditures 
certainly not regularly occurring in the ordinary administration of government affairs. In 
contrast, expenditures incurred to pay for city and school district employee salaries and 
retirement benefits, repairs to municipal property and general municipal services-including 
power purchases by a municipal electric utility to provide electric services-dearly do not 
involve financing capital projects. Rather, these are ongoing, regularly occurring municipal 
expenditures for essential services. The Framers did not intend to subject these types of 
necessary expenditures to a vote, and it would be absurd to do so. These types of expenditures 
are simply "ordinary and necessary expenses" within the plain ineaning of those terms. 
By executing the Renewal Power Sales Agreement the City has simply committed to 
continue to pay for an ordinary and necessary expenditure that it already pays for and would 
continue to pay for anyway. Tfthe City did not enter into the Renewal Power Sales Agreement, 
it would still have to purchase its power supply needs from other sources (since it cannot 
immediately acquire or construct a new generating facility).72 In this event, the City would 
include the cost of power purchases in its annual budget every year, and pay for power as 
services are received. As the District Court observed, 
[a] contract to buy power in the future is simply a promise to 
continue to pay for a municipal budgetary item in the future. In 
other words, the City already pays for electrical power for its 
residents. It shall continue to pay for electrical power for its 
citizens in one form or another out of its annual budget. That the 
particular form or [sic] electric power purchase before the Court 
involves a substantial savings over a seventeen (17) year period 
72 Elg Affidavit at p. 9, 21 (R. Voi. I1 at 523). 
- 23 - 
does not erase the fact that the City is not creating or incurring a 
new debt, but paying for power from it [sic] annual budget. In so 
doing, the City is capturing a significant savings by promising to 
buy in the future, from Bonneville Power, an already budgeted 
item. 73 
As discussed above, it is often in a city's best interest to execute a multi-year contract for 
municipal services. In the case of the Renewal Power Sales Contract, however, it is absolutely 
essential. Purchasing power on an annual or more frequent basis would subject the City to 
significant market risk and price volatility. As discussed in the Mooney Report and the affidavits 
of Idaho Falls Power management, the City has no meaningful alternative to the Renewal Power 
Sales Agreement.74 In the absence of the Renewal Power Sales Agreement, the City would be 
forced to obtain short-term power supplies in the wholesale market for most of the System's 
requirements. The prices, terms and risks of wholesale market supplies are substantially less 
advantageous to the City than the Renewal Power Sales Agreement and would expose Idaho 
Falls Power and the consulners it serves to increased power supply costs, as well as unacceptable 
price volatility and reliability risks.75 
In summary, the Renewal Power Sales Agreement is a true service contract for essential 
power supply services. It creates only a "pay-as-you-go" obligation of the City to pay for 
services rendered. Accordingly, the Renewal Power Sales Agreement is clearly within the 
established precedents of the Idaho Supreme Court for multi-year employment contracts and 
other ordinarily and regularly-occurring municipal expenses. 
73  Order Granting Petition for Judicial Confirmation at 5 (emphasis added). 
74 See Mooney Report at pp. 24-28 (R. Vol. 1 at 59-36), Elg Affidavit at pp. 7-10,¶¶18-23 (R. Vol. I1 at 521- 
24) and Flowers Affidavit at p. 10, W 28-30 (R. Vol. I1 at 513). 
75 Elg Affidavit at p. 9,7 19 (R. Vol. 11 at 523). 
C. TNE CITY'S OBLIGATiONS UNDER THE RENEWAL POWER SALES AGREEMENT ARE 
ORDINARYAND NECESSARY EXPENSES UNDER ASSON V CITY OF BURLEY 
Asson v City of Burley is the only decision of the Idaho Supreme Court applying Art. 
VIII, 5 3 to a power purchase agreement and, prior to the Court's decision in Frazier, was 
perhaps the leading case on the meaning of the proviso clause. Accordingly, a discussion of the 
Asson case and a comparison of the City's payment obligations under the Renewal Power Sales 
Agreement to the participants' agreement (the "Participants' Agreement") with the Washington 
Public Power Supply System ("WPPSS") at issue in Asson is instructive in this case.76 
In Asson, five Idaho cities that operate municipal eiectric utilities, together with dozens of 
other utilities in the Pacific Northwest, executed the Participants' Agreement for the purchase of 
"project capability" of two proposed nuclear power plants. Under the "dry hole" liability 
provision of the Participants' Agreement, the participating utilities were unconditionally 
obligated to pay their shares of debt service on all bonds issued by WPPSS to finance the plants, 
regardless of the fact that construction of the plants might never be con~pleted and the 
participants might never receive any e l e~ t r i c i t y .~~  After issuing over $2 billion of bonds, 
WPPSS could not obtain further financing, the nuclear power projects were terminated and 
WPPSS proceeded to enforce the payment obligations of the participating utilities on the 
outstanding Bonds. The Court in Asson found that the Participants' Agreement was void as to 
the Idaho cities because no authorizing election had been held, the cities9 payment obligations 
were not "ordinary" and they were "underwriting another entity's indebtedness in return for 
merely the possibility of electricity."78 
76 105 ldaho 432,670 P.2d 839. 
77 Id. at 443,670 P.2d at 850. 
78 id at 443,670 P.2d at 850. 
In contrast to the WPPSS Participants' Agreement, the Renewal Power Saics Agreement 
imposes no construction risk or "dry hole" liability upon the City. As discussed above, no debt 
will be issued or incurred by Bonneville to finance the cost of new generating facilities to serve 
the City under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement, and Bonneville has no statutory authority 
whatsoever to undertake any such fa~ilities.~g Rather, only the existing and operating generating 
facilities of the Federal Power System will be used to serve the City and the City will, on a pay- 
as-you basis, purchase power, at Bonneviile's costs, from these facilities. Accordingly, the 
Renewal Power Sales Agreement is a bona j d e  services contract and the City's payment 
obligations under it are ordinary and necessary expenses. 
It cannot be emphasized enough that here, no new capital project is being financed-no 
new courthouse as in Bannock County, bridge as in Dunbur, nuclear power plant as in Asson or 
parking garage as in Frazier.80 The Renewal Power Sales Agreement is simply a true, "pay-as- 
you-go" service contract. Thus, unlike the agreements at issue in Asson, in this case the 
obligations encompassed within Renewal Power Sales Agreement are both ordinary and 
necessary. They do not constitute special indebtedness. Rather, these obligations are expenses 
which arise in the ordinary administration of local government affairs. 
111. THE CITY'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE RENEWAL POWER SALES AGREEMENT ARE 
ORDINARY AND NECESSARY BECAUSE THE PROVISION OF ELECTRICITY IS A DUTY THE 
CITY IS LEGALLY OBLIGATED TO PERFORM. 
The District Court determined that because the City has a legal obligation to provide its 
residents with electricity, the City's payment obligations under the Renewal Power Sales 
79 See Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. g 791a, erseq. 
80 See 5 I.c, supra. 
Agreement are expenses the City is legally obligated to perform "promptly," thus satisfying the 
"urgency" component of Frazier.81 
The City contends that the District Court was correct in finding that the City has a legal 
duty to provide power to its citizens, although for different reasons than those cited by the 
District Court. S2 The City acknowledges that the Mayor is correct in his assertion that the City 
is not a "public utility" within the meaning of Idaho Code 9 61-302.83 Nevertheless, the City 
asserts that the District Court correctly found that "the expense of providing electrical power to 
its citizens is a duty the City is legally obligated to perform."84 Under the Idaho statutory 
framework, cities are authorized to construct, own and operate electric generating and 
transmission facilities. Once they choose to exercise that authority, they assume a legal duty to 
their citizens to supply electrical energy for the health, welfare, and benefit of their citizens. It is 
that legal duty, assumed by the City, which supports the District Court's conclusion that 
obligations evidenced by the Renewal Power Sales Agreements were necessary expenses within 
the meaning of Art. VIII, 9 3. Thus, this Court can uphold the District Court's decision, albeit 
applying a different statutory framework than was used by the District C o w  below. 
Idaho cities may assume a duty to provide or cause to be provided necessary utility 
services, including electricity, to their inhabitants. This duty was recognized in Alpert v. Boise 
Water Corp., where the Court recognized that Idaho cities are authorized to either provide utility 
services directly to their residents or grant a franchise to other entities to provide the necessary 
8' See Order Granting Petition for Judicial Confirmation at 10-1 1 (R. Vol. I1 at 620-21). 
82 It has long been held by Idaho courts that a determination of a lower court may be affirmed on alternate 
grounds. See, e.g., BECO Const. Co.. Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho 7 19, 724, 184 P.3d 844, 849 
(2008) (quoting J R .  Simplot Co., Inc. v. Idaho State Tar Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849, 853, 820 P.2d 1206, 
1210 (1991). 
83 Appellant's Brief at 7-8. 
84 Order Granting Petition for Judicial Confirmation at 10 (R. Vol. I1 at 620). 
utility services.85 Specifically, the Court spelled out the duty of a city, once it elects to provide 
utility services: 
It is the duty of the municipality to light its public streets and to 
furnish its inhabitants with tlie means of obtaining gas at their own 
expense, and having the power by legislative grant to erect and 
maintain gasworks for that purpose, it necessarily follows that it 
had the implied power to contract with others to furnish it in like 
manner. . "86 
Wl~ere a niunicipality has undertaken to provide essential electric utility services directly 
to its inhabitants pursuant to Idaho Code 5 50-325, the municipality has a duty to continue to 
provide electric utility services at reasonable rates. That duty has been recognized by the Idaho 
Legislature, first, in Idaho Code 5 50-325 which authorizes judicial review of municipal electric 
utility rates. Additionally, Idaho Code 3 50-326 prohibits a city that owns an electric power 
plant or transmission and distribution system from selling or leasing the same before the question 
has been submitted to the taxpayers at a special election - thus, by inference, recognizing that a 
city may not abandon its assumed duty without a public referendum approving such course of 
action. Finally, Idaho Code $9 50-325 and 50-327 prohibit a city which operates a power plant 
from selling power that is not "excess power," defined as power that is not needed by the city or 
its inhabitants. These sections are indicative of the essentiality of electricity to a city's residents 
and support the imposition of a binding duty to provide necessary electric services at reasonable 
prices to its customers, once a municipality elects to assume the role of a municipal utility 
provider. 
85 118 Idaho 136, 141, 795 P.2d 298, 303 (1990). Specifically with respect to the provision of electricity, the 
Alperr decision recognized cities must provide the necessary services pursuant to the authority granted in 
Idaho Code 5; 50-325, or else cause the services to be provided pursuant to a grant of franchise authority 
pursuant to Idaho Code $5  50-329 through 50-330. Id 
year utility contracts are 'expenses the [City] . . . was legally obligated to perform promptly."'90 
As the statutory framework cited above indicates, the City has assumed a legal duty to continue 
to provide electric power at reasonable rates, and that duty is satisfied by City's prompt 
assumption of the obligations imposed by the Renewal Power Sales Agreement. 
Although the District Court premised its decision upon a finding that the City's 
obligations under Renewal Power Sales Agreement were in performance of a legal duty to 
supply essential utility services, nevertheless, this Court should also find that those obligations 
are ordinary and necessary expenses because by their nature they are essential to the performance 
of a usual or customary governmental function. Accordingly, this Court may affirm the District 
Court's conclusion on alternate grounds. 
IV. BECAUSE THE CITY'S OBLIGATlONS UNDER THE RENEWAL POWER SALES AGREEMENT ARE 
ORDMARY AND NECESSARY. THE CITY'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CREDITWORTHINESS 
AGREEMENT ARE ALSO ORDINARY AND NECESSARY. 
The City, like all of Bonneville's preference customers who will purchase the Slice 
product under their renewal power sales agreements beginning in 201 1, was required to enter 
into a Creditworthiness Agreement with Bonneville. Under the Creditworthiness Agreement, 
upon the occurrence of certain events Bonneville may in the future require the City to post cash 
collateral or a letter of credit issued by a commercial bank to secure its payment obligations 
under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement. The cash or letter of credit is required to be in an 
amount equal to 12% of the City's total annual power payments to Bonneville. If Idaho Falls 
Power fails to pay a power bill under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement, Bonneville would 
have the right to draw on the cash or the letter of credit to satisfy the unpaid amount. 
Idaho case law is very clear that the Creditworthiness Agreement does not create a new 
or separate obligation apart from the Renewal Power Sales Agreement. In Butler, the City of 
90 Id at 10 (R. Vol. I!. at 620). 
The duty of a municipal electric utility to continuously provide electric services is further 
imposed by Idaho Code S; 50-302, which requires a municipality to act for the general welfare of 
its inhabitants.87 Where electricity is so essential and necessary to the public health, safety and 
welfare in our modern world-indeed, without electricity, businesses, households, govenment 
and essential facilities (such as hospitals) simply could not function-it cannot be asserted that a 
municipal electric utility has any lesser duty than that of an investor-owned public utility to 
continually provide its customers with essential electricity at reasonable rates, once it assumes 
the role of a municipal provider.8s In sum, the duty of a municipal electric utility to provide 
electricity is, for all practical purposes, comparable to that of a "public utility" under the Idaho 
Public Utilities Law. For purposes of Art. VIII, 5 3, that duty amounts to a legal obligation that 
must be performed promptly (and continuously) by the City. 
The District Courl held that the City's obligations under the Renewal Power Sales 
Agreement were necessary by analyzing those obligations under F r a ~ i e r . ~ ~  As noted above, the 
City does not believe that Fraziev's analytical framework is applicable to the type of obligations 
at issue in this case. Nevertheless, assuming arguendo, that the District Court was correct in 
applying Frazier to the instant case, the District Court was correct in holding that the obligations 
under the Renewal Power Supply Contract were "necessary" under Frazier because the "multi- 
87 Idaho Code 50-302 states, "Cities shall make all such ordinances, bylaws, rules, regulations and 
resolutions not inconsistent with the laws of the state of Idaho as may be expedient, in addition to the 
special powers in this act [Title SO] granted, to maintain the peace, good government and welfare of the 
corporation and its trade, commerce and industry." (Emphasis added) 
88 The Idaho Legislature has recognized the essential nature of affordable electricity to the public health, 
safety and welfare in authorizing municipal electric utilities to participate in joint electric generation and 
transmission projects in Idaho Code 5 50-342A, wherein the Legislature declared that "securing long-term 
electric generation and transmission resources at cost-based rates . . . is essential to the economy and the 
economic development of [municipal] communities and to the public health, safety and welfare." 
89 Order Granting Petition for Judicial Confirmation at 9-1 1 (R. Vol. 11. at 619-21). 
Lewiston issued warrants to pay for certain municipal expenses, including the salaries of city 
officers and enlployees and a tort judgment against the city, and subsequently determined to 
issue bonds to fund the warrants. The Court determined that "[tlhe bonds proposed to be issued 
are to be issued for the purpose of funding the outstanding warrant indebtedness of the city. 
Such bonds will not increase the legal indebtedness of the city, but simply change the form of 
existing indebtedness from warrant to bond. . . The question arises, then, whether the warrant 
indebtedness which is sought to be changed to bonded indebtedness arose from the ordinary and 
necessary expenses authorized by the general laws of the state."91 After an examination of the 
expenses funded with the warrants, the Court held that these were "ordinary and necessary 
expenses" within the meaning of Art. VIII, 5 3, and that the funding bonds were validly issued 
without the need for an authorizing election.92 
Similarly, in Hickey, the City of Nampa proposed to issue bonds to fund warrant 
indebtedness previously incurred to pay for repairs and replacements to the city's water system, 
salaries of city officers, firefighting equipment and other "necessary expenditures in the 
maintenance of the municipal government."93 The Court held that these expenditures were 
"ordinary and necessary expenses" within the meaning of Art. VIII, 3 3, and that the bonds were 
treated as a continuation of the original "ordinary and necessary expense" represented by the 
warrants. The Court stated: 
Having determined that the indebtedness for which the warrants 
were issued is lawful, and that the warrants are binding and valid 
obligations of the city, it follows ... that the council might 
authorize and issue funding bonds without submitting the question 
to a vote of the people. This was not the creation of any new 
9 1 11 Idaho at 403-04,83 P. at 238. 
92 Id. 
93 22 Idaho at 43,124 P. at 280 
indebtedness, but was rather the changing of the form of the 
indebtedness, or paying an ordinary debt already incurred.94 
Applying the decisions of the Supreme Court in Butler and Hickey, if the amounts 
payable by the City under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement constitute "ordinary and 
necessary expenses" then the amounts posted or paid by the City under the Creditworthiness 
Agreement, whether as a posting of cash and replenishment of amounts drawn or a posting of a 
letter of credit and reimbursement to the bank of amounts drawn, must also constitute "ordinary 
and necessary expenses". No new obligation of the City is created under the Creditworthiness 
Agreement, rather, there is merely a change in form of the City's original obligation under the 
Renewal Power Sales Agreement which itself was an "ordinary and necessary expense". This is, 
in substance, identical to the issuance of bonds to fund warrant indebtedness, where the warrants 
are redeemed and the city's original obligation takes the form of repayment to the bond holders. 
CONCLUSION 
The City's obligations under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement are ordinary and 
necessary expenses within the meaning of Art. VIII, 5 3. The drafters of the Idaho Constitution 
intended that municipal governments be able to incur ordinary indebtedness without an 
authorizing election. The proceedings and debates of the Framers of the Idaho Constitution, and 
the holdings of Idaho cases interpreting the proviso clause of Art. VIII, 5 3 show that it is the 
character of the obligation that determines whether it is ordinary and necessary. Idaho case law 
also makes it clear that an expense is "necessary" within the meaning of the proviso clause where 
it is essential to fulfill a local government's customary, regular or recurring functions. The 
provision of reliable, affordable electric utility services is a duty the City is practically and 
legally obligated lo perform. The City's obligations under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement 
arise in the ordinary administration of local government affairs because they are essential to the 
94 Id. at 46, 124 P. at 281. 
City's ability to provide reliable, cost-efficient resources to residents of the City. Consequently, 
the City's obligations under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement are "necessary" within the 
meaning and intent of Art. VIII, § 3 even though no "urgency" exists. 
Because the City's payment obligations under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement are 
"ordinary and necessary expenses," it follows that any obligations the City would incur under the 
Creditworthiness Agreement are also "ordinary and necessary." No new obligation of the City is 
created under the Creditworthiness Agreemenr, rather, there is merely a change in form of the 
original obligation which itself is an "ordinary and necessary expense." 
This Court should affirm the decision of the District Court. 
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